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Short Sales, Long Sales, and  
the Lee-Ready Trade Classification Algorithm Revisited 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Asquith, Oman, and Safaya (2010) conclude that short sales are often misclassified by the Lee-
Ready algorithm. The algorithm identifies most short sales as buyer-initiated, whereas the 
authors posit that short sales should be overwhelmingly seller-initiated. Using order data to 
identify true trade initiator, we document that short sales are, in fact, predominantly buyer-
initiated and that the Lee-Ready algorithm correctly classifies most of them. Misclassification 
rates for short and long sales are near zero at the daily level. At the trade level, misclassification 
rates are 31% using contemporaneous quotes and trades and decline to 21% when quotes are 
lagged one second. 
 1 
1. Introduction 
Research in securities markets relies on trade direction to arrive at inferences on a wide array 
of subjects, from transaction costs and trading behavior of various investor groups to market 
efficiency and optimal market structure. Because trading data from many sources, including the 
NYSE’s Trade and Quote (TAQ) database, lack trade direction identifiers, it is impossible to 
directly determine from these data whether a trade was initiated by a buyer or by a seller. Thus 
the literature has developed methods that allow for indirect trade classification, commonly 
referred to as “trade classification algorithms.” The ability of such algorithms to correctly 
identify the trade initiator directly affects the credibility of a large body of empirical research. 
The most commonly used trade classification algorithm is that proposed by Lee and Ready 
(1991).1 The Lee-Ready algorithm infers trade direction from the trade price position relative to 
the prevailing quotes and historical prices. Studies using data from the early 1990s find that the 
Lee-Ready algorithm correctly classifies about 85% of all trades (e.g., Finucane, 2000; Odders-
White, 2000), but in recent years questions have arisen about the efficacy of the Lee-Ready 
algorithm given the significant changes in market structure since the early 1990s.  
Most recently, Asquith, Oman, and Safaya (2010) argue conceptually that short sales should 
be predominantly seller-initiated, yet they find that the Lee-Ready algorithm more often 
classifies short sales as buyer-initiated. The authors conclude that the algorithm is unreliable 
when used to classify short sales. Such a conclusion casts a shadow over many recent studies of 
short selling that use the Lee-Ready algorithm to sign trades. These studies find that short sellers 
provide liquidity when it is needed, help keep prices in check, and contribute to price discovery 
and market efficiency (e.g., Alexander and Peterson, 2008; Diether, Lee, and Werner, 2009b; 
                                                 
1 Although a number of alternative algorithms have been developed (e.g., Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara, 2000; 
Chakrabarty, Li, Nguyen, and Van Ness, 2007), the Lee-Ready algorithm remains the most frequently used.    
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Bailey and Zheng, 2010; Boehmer and Wu, 2010; and Comerton-Forde, Jones, and Putniņš, 
2011). These findings are important from a policymaking standpoint, particularly in light of the 
negative public image of short sellers and recent debates over bringing back short-sale 
restrictions.2 Furthermore, even studies that do not focus on short selling would be compromised 
if short sales were systematically misclassified by the Lee-Ready algorithm, as short sales 
represent a significant portion of general trading activity (e.g., Diether, Lee, and Werner, 2009a, 
report that short selling accounts for over 24% of the volume in NYSE stocks and for over 36% 
of the volume in NASDAQ stocks). Given the importance of understanding short and long 
sellers’ actions for academic research and policymaking, it is imperative to assess the Lee-Ready 
algorithm’s reliability in classifying trades. 
In this paper, we use INET3 order data to examine whether the Lee-Ready algorithm 
correctly identifies the true trade initiator for short sales. We also examine the Lee-Ready 
algorithm’s accuracy for long sales to see if the performance differs for short versus long sales. 
The INET order data allow us to match each trade to the orders that constitute it and determine 
whether the trade is triggered by a sell order or a buy order, without relying on the Lee-Ready (or 
any other) algorithm. We follow the convention in the market microstructure literature of 
considering a trade to be “initiated” by the last party to agree to the trade, the party whose 
decision causes the trade to occur. The initiator is thus the liquidity demander in the trade. For 
each INET trade, we identify the true trade initiator from the order data and then compare these 
true initiation statistics with the Lee-Ready estimates.  
                                                 
2 “There’s a Better Way to Prevent ‘Bear Raids’” by R. Pozen and Y. Bar-Yam, The Wall Street Journal, November 
18, 2008; “Restore the Uptick Rule, Restore Confidence” by C. Schwab, The Wall Street Journal, December 9, 
2008; “Four European Nations to Curtail Short Sales” by L. Story and S. Castle, The New York Times, August 11, 
2011; “Studies Find Shorting Bans Come Up Short” by J. Armstrong, Traders Magazine Online News, October 4, 
2011. 
3 Until 2005, when it was acquired by NASDAQ, INET was an independent Electronic Communications Network 
(ECN). In 2006, INET and NASDAQ were integrated, and INET became NASDAQ’s primary trading platform 
(Hasbrouck and Saar, 2009).  
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Our study addresses three issues. First, we ask whether Lee-Ready correctly classifies short 
sales at the daily level, to shed light on Asquith et al.’s (2010) argument regarding short sales. 
We also analyze long sales to provide a basis for comparing whether Lee-Ready performs 
relatively worse for short than long sales and  address more general concerns about using Lee-
Ready to sign trades. Second, we examine the accuracy of the Lee-Ready algorithm at the trade 
level, comparing the results from our 2005 sample to the trade-level results from the early 1990s 
(as in Odders-White, 2000). As part of our trade-level analysis, we re-examine the current 
practice of using contemporaneous quotes to sign trades versus Lee and Ready’s (1991) 
recommendation that quotes should be lagged. Third, we examine the consequences of trade 
misclassification at the daily and intraday level in the context of studying the aggressiveness of 
short and long sellers. We ask whether inferences about short- and long-seller aggressiveness 
based on the true trade initiator are different from those obtained using the Lee-Ready algorithm.  
Addressing the first issue, we find that short sales are more often buyer-initiated than seller-
initiated, whereas long sales are more often seller-initiated than buyer-initiated. About 43% of 
short sales are truly seller-initiated in our sample, whereas close to 54% of long sales are truly 
seller-initiated. In other words, in short sales it is the buyer of securities who usually causes the 
trade to occur by taking the liquidity provided by a short seller. In contrast, long sellers consume 
liquidity more often than they provide it. These findings are important on two levels. First, the 
Lee-Ready algorithm appears to be correct in classifying most short sales as buyer-initiated, in 
contrast to Asquith et al.’s (2010) conjectures. Second, at the daily level, Lee-Ready 
classifications match true trade classifications almost perfectly. The differences between true and 
inferred classifications are insignificant statistically and economically. These results provide 
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support for studies such as Diether et al. (2009b) and Bailey and Zheng (2010) that use daily data 
to draw inferences. 
That the Lee-Ready algorithm performs well at the daily level does not guarantee that it is 
equally accurate at the trade level, since daily aggregation could obscure offsetting trade 
misclassifications. To address our second question, we compare the trade initiator estimates of 
Lee-Ready to the true trade initiator from the order data. Using contemporaneous quotes and 
trades, Lee-Ready misclassifies up to 32% of all short sales and up to 31% of all long sales. 
Because misclassification rates are similar for buyer-initiated and seller-initiated trades, they 
cancel each other out at the daily level, resulting in the high daily success rates reported earlier. 
Although our results are not directly comparable to those in Odders-White (2000), we note that 
misclassifications appear to have increased from the early 1990s, when Odders-White finds that 
about 15% of all trades are misclassified. 
We next examine whether the increase in misclassifications is explained by temporal changes 
in trade or stock characteristics that the earlier literature finds are related to the error rates of the 
Lee-Ready algorithm. We confirm that trade size, trade price relative to the NBBO, stock trading 
frequency, and firm size are still important determinants of misclassification rates in our sample, 
yet none of these characteristics changes enough to explain the overall increase in 
misclassification rates since the 1990s. We further show that a relatively simple adjustment to 
the algorithm reduces misclassification rates by about one third: Using a one-second quote lag 
lowers the incidence of misclassification from 32% to 21% for short sales and from 31% to 22% 
for long sales. This finding suggests that researchers should consider returning to the practice of 
lagging quotes in intraday studies. Notably, lagging quotes does not improve Lee-Ready 
accuracy in the daily aggregates. 
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Finally, we examine the consequences of trade misclassification for the inferences drawn 
from studying short sale and long sale aggressiveness in a multivariate framework.  Diether et al. 
(2009b) find that the variation in short selling as a percentage of total volume suggests that short 
sellers are contrarian, risk-bearing liquidity providers. Extending their argument to trade 
aggressiveness (the percentage of trades that are seller-initiated), we confirm that short sellers 
indeed often act as liquidity providers, as do long sellers. Short sellers and long sellers are less 
aggressive (provide more liquidity) on days when returns and buy-sell order imbalances are 
positive. On days when returns are negative, short and long sellers demand liquidity.  Notably, 
liquidity supply and demand patterns by short and long sellers are statistically indistinguishable, 
which is surprising given short sellers’ negative reputation. On the intraday level, we find that 
short sellers (but not long sellers) provide more liquidity when spreads are wider. Using Lee-
Ready estimates generally leads to inferences that are similar to those obtained using true trade 
direction, although some coefficient estimates differ economically. Overall, our findings support 
the use of the Lee-Ready algorithm in daily studies; however, studies using the Lee-Ready 
algorithm at the intraday level should be aware of the increase in trade misclassifications since 
the early 1990s. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data and sample. 
Section 3 presents our results on the performance of the Lee-Ready estimates compared to the 
true data for short sales and long sales in a univariate setting. Section 4 compares the 
performance of the Lee-Ready estimates to the true data in a multivariate analysis of trade 
aggressiveness. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Data and sample selection 
Our analysis uses data from TAQ, the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), the 
short sales data provided by exchanges under the SEC’s Reg SHO initiative, and order data from 
INET. We analyze data from two months (June and December 2005) to replicate the sample 
period in Asquith et al. (2010).4 In 2005, under Reg SHO, one third of the stocks in the Russell 
3000 index are designated as pilot stocks, for which short sale price tests are suspended. The 
remaining – non-pilot – stocks are subject to an uptick rule on the NYSE and a bid price test on 
NASDAQ.5  
 
2.1 Sample construction 
We construct our sample of pilot stocks as follows. From CRSP, we collect all NASDAQ-
listed common stocks (SHRCD = 10 and 11, EXCH = 3) that trade every day during May, June, 
and December 2005. We exclude NASDAQ small-cap stocks (NMSID = 3) and stocks with 
prices below $5 per share. We then use the Reg SHO list to separate the stocks into a pilot 
sample (342 stocks) and a non-pilot sample (1,319 stocks). To form a size-stratified sample of 
pilot stocks, we rank the pilot stocks by market capitalization as of the end of May 2005 and 
select every third stock, for a total of 100 stocks. 
We construct a matched sample of 100 non-pilot stocks as follows. Using one-to-one 
matching without replacement, we determine a unique non-pilot match for each stock in our pilot 
sample based on CRSP market capitalization, closing price, and share volume. We use market 
                                                 
4 In addition to June and December, Asquith et al. (2010) analyze data from March 2005, finding results similar to 
the other two months. We exclude March 2005 from our analysis because the Reg SHO pilot program does not 
formally commence until May 2, 2005 (SEC Release No. 50747 (November 29, 2004)). 
5 Under the uptick rule, a short sale is allowed only on a plus tick or on a zero tick where the most recent price 
change preceding the zero tick was a plus-tick (called a zero-plus tick). Under the bid price test, a short sale is not 
allowed at or below the inside bid when the current inside bid is at or below the previous inside bid.  
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capitalization and price at the end of May 2005 and average daily trading volume in May 2005, 
which precedes our analysis period. We randomize the order of matching by sorting the pilot 
stocks alphabetically by ticker symbol. We then calculate the following matching error for each 
pilot stock i and each remaining non-pilot stock j:  
matching error = 111 
j
i
j
i
j
i
VOL
VOL
PRC
PRC
MCAP
MCAP ,    (1) 
where MCAP is the stock’s market capitalization, PRC is the stock’s closing price, and VOL is 
the stock’s average daily volume. For each pilot stock, we select the non-pilot stock with the 
lowest matching error and subsequently remove the selected non-pilot stock from the list of 
potential non-pilot matches for the remaining pilot stocks. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics 
for the pilot stocks and the matched sample of non-pilot stocks.  
[Table 1 Here] 
Table 1 shows that the pilot and non-pilot samples are well-matched on market capitalization, 
price, and volume, with mean and median differences insignificantly different from zero. The 
pilot and non-pilot samples also exhibit similar volume-based characteristics (i.e., number of 
trades, number of short sales, number of shorted shares, and proportion of short volume in total 
volume). We note that a few of the spread differences are statistically significant, yet they are 
economically small and the differences switch signs among the four measures. For example, the 
mean percentage quoted spread is higher for pilot stocks, but the median percentage quoted 
spread is lower. Overall, there are no consistent differences between the two samples. 
We note that our sample of stocks differs from that of Asquith et al. (2010). Our sample 
consists of 200 stocks selected to evenly represent the distribution of market capitalizations of 
NASDAQ stocks, while the Asquith et al. sample consists of 200 randomly selected stocks, 100 
of which are listed on the NYSE and 100 are listed on NASDAQ. We restrict our sample to 
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NASDAQ stocks because INET accounts for less than one percent of trading in NYSE stocks 
during our sample period (Shkilko, Van Ness, and Van Ness, 2010). An additional difference 
between our sample and the Asquith et al. sample is that our pilot stocks are paired to non-pilot 
stocks in a one-to-one match, whereas Asquith et al. do not match their pilot stocks to non-pilot 
stocks. Instead, their random sample contains 35 NYSE pilot stocks, 65 NYSE non-pilot stocks, 
22 NASDAQ pilot stocks, and 78 non-pilot NASDAQ stocks. We examine pilot and non-pilot 
stocks separately to make our analysis comparable to that in Asquith et al.; however, we note that 
INET did not enforce NASDAQ’s bid price test for short sales during our sample period (Diether 
et al., 2009a). Thus, our data may preclude us from detecting the same magnitude of differences 
between the pilot and non-pilot samples as that reported by Asquith et al. The results from our 
sample are more likely to be comparable to their pilot sample results. 
Our primary motivation for examining June and December 2005 is to replicate the period 
studied in Asquith et al. (2010). These two months also offer the advantage of capturing a recent, 
relatively “normal” time in the markets – after decimalization, but before the financial crisis and 
the scrutiny of short sellers that followed (e.g., Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang, 2009; Beber and 
Pagano, 2011). Figure 1 demonstrates that prices of the sample stocks generally rise in June 2005 
and fall in December 2005. We examine the results for the two months separately as well as 
jointly in case the accuracy of the Lee-Ready algorithm or the degree of seller initiation is 
sensitive to market direction.  
[Figure 1 Here] 
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2.2 Determination of trade initiator for INET trades 
The heart of this paper is a comparison of the true percentage of short and long sales that are 
seller-initiated, as determined from the INET order data, and the percentage of short and long 
sales estimated to be seller-initiated by the Lee-Ready algorithm. In this section, we first 
examine how much of the trading in NASDAQ stocks occurs on INET and then discuss the 
identification of trade initiator using order data and the Lee-Ready algorithm.  
INET trading in NASDAQ stocks. Since our order data come from the INET trading 
platform, a natural concern is how much of market-wide trading occurs on INET. Nearly all of 
the trading in NASDAQ stocks during our sample period occurs on three venues: NASDAQ, 
INET (which is owned by NASDAQ but at this time operates as a separate market and reports 
trades separately from NASDAQ), and Arca (which has not yet merged with the NYSE). Table 2 
shows that INET is the second-largest trading venue, representing about one quarter of total 
trading volume in our sample stocks in the month prior to our sample period (Panel A: May 
2005) and a similar fraction in the two sample months (Panels B and C: June and December 
2005). We note that INET and Arca, which are pure limit order books, have a smaller average 
trade size than does NASDAQ.6 Finucane (2000) and Odders-White (2000) find that smaller 
trades are more often misclassified by the Lee-Ready algorithm, which could bias our study 
towards finding more misclassification on INET than occurs on NASDAQ at this time. We 
return to this issue in Section 3.  
                                                 
6 Shkilko, Van Ness, and Van Ness (2008) find that trades on NASDAQ are about twice as large as trades on the 
National Stock Exchange (the host market for INET trades during our sample). Since 2005, NASDAQ’s average 
trade size has fallen as NASDAQ has begun to resemble a pure limit-order market. In 2006, INET absorbed 
NASDAQ's SuperMontage and BRUT systems to become NASDAQ’s primary trading platform (Hasbrouck and 
Saar, 2009). According to Brian Hyndman, Senior Vice President NASDAQ OMX, by September 2010 NASDAQ’s 
average trade size had fallen to 225 shares (http://www.thetradenews.com/asset-classes/equities/5091). 
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Arca and, to a lesser extent, INET attract a higher percentage of short sales than long sales. 
This pattern is likely attributable to the less strict enforcement of the bid test by these two venues 
as compared to NASDAQ (Diether et al., 2009a). The remaining three venues, the Chicago Stock 
Exchange, FINRA’s Alternative Display Facility (ADF), and the American Stock Exchange 
(AMEX), execute very little volume in our sample.   
[Table 2 Here] 
Trade initiator from INET order data. For our analysis, we must identify short sales and 
long sales in the INET dataset. The Reg SHO dataset identifies short sales by the exchange on 
which they are reported. During our sample period, INET reports all of its trades via the National 
Stock Exchange (NSX), and INET is the only major market that reports via the NSX.7 We 
identify INET short sales by matching the NSX short sales to INET data on executed orders, 
based on ticker, date, time stamp, price, and traded quantity. We treat the remaining INET 
executions as long sales. Time stamps in the INET data are in milliseconds, and time stamps in 
the Reg SHO data are in seconds. Since there may be slippage in reported timestamps, we 
truncate INET time stamps to seconds and examine a look-ahead/look-back window of up to 10 
seconds to find the matching trade. Over 98% of short sales are matched within one second, and 
99.5% are matched within five seconds (see Appendix for the frequency distribution of matches). 
In the remainder of the paper, we use matches based on the one-second window, for consistency 
with Asquith et al. (2010). We also run a series of robustness checks including all trades for 
which matches occur within longer look-ahead/look-back windows. The results from these 
checks are nearly identical to the reported results and are available on request. 
                                                 
7 When INET switches reporting from NSX to NASDAQ in February 2006, NSX reported volume drops to nearly 
zero.   
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The INET data indicate whether each trade executes against a sitting buy or sell order in the 
limit order book.8 Following the chronology of order submission logic proposed by Odders-
White (2000), we designate trades that execute against a sitting buy order (a buy limit order) as 
seller-initiated and trades that execute against a sitting sell order (a sell limit order) as buyer-
initiated. This procedure produces a dataset of short sales and long sales executed on the INET 
platform with the true trade initiator identified directly from the order data.  
Trade initiator from the Lee-Ready algorithm. To identify the trade initiator based on the 
Lee-Ready algorithm, we compare the price of each INET trade to the midpoint of the prevailing 
National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO) quotes. For our main analyses we use contemporaneous 
quotes to sign trades. In Section 3, we examine how lagging the quotes affects the accuracy of 
trade classification. A trade is classified as seller-initiated if it occurs below the NBBO midpoint 
and as buyer-initiated if it occurs above the midpoint. Trades occurring at the NBBO midpoint 
are classified as seller-initiated (buyer-initiated) if the trade price is lower (higher) than the price 
of the previous trade, with the previous trade drawn from the consolidated trade tape.  
 
3. Lee-Ready algorithm versus true trade initiator 
We begin this section by examining the seller-initiation percentages for short and long sales 
at the daily aggregation level. This analysis is comparable to Asquith et al. (2010). To augment 
this analysis, we then examine the misclassification frequencies at the trade level. The latter, 
more granular approach allows us to see whether the daily results reflect the true classification 
accuracy or are driven by trade misclassifications offsetting each other intraday. 
                                                 
8 For a detailed description of the INET order book data, see Hasbrouck and Saar (2009). 
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3.1 Classification at the daily level 
Table 3 compares the percentage of short sales (Panel A) and long sales (Panel B) that are 
truly seller-initiated (True) to the percentage of sales identified as seller-initiated by the Lee-
Ready algorithm (LR-estimated). We present the results as the percentage of trades and the 
percentage of share volume, treating the individual stock as the unit of observation. That is, we 
compute the seller-initiated percentage for each stock by averaging across sample days and then 
report the average across stocks. 
 [Table 3 Here] 
The differences between the True and LR-estimated seller-initiated percentages are 
statistically insignificant in all periods, for both short and long sales, in both the pilot and non-
pilot samples. For example, the true proportion of seller-initiated short trades in pilot stocks 
during the combined period is 42.6%, and the Lee-Ready algorithm estimates this share as 42.8% 
– a statistically insignificant difference. Similarly, the true share of seller-initiated long trades in 
pilot stocks is 54.7%, compared to the Lee-Ready estimated 54.8%. We find similar results when 
we compare the percentage of seller-initiated share volume instead of seller-initiated trades (see 
columns labeled %Shares in Table 3). 
Our order-based analysis indicates that the preponderance of buyer initiation in short sales is 
true rather than the result of inaccuracies of the Lee-Ready algorithm as Asquith et al. (2010) 
suggest. Another notable observation from our findings is that short sellers are typically engaged 
in liquidity provision, as they initiate less than half of the trades they are involved in.9 Long 
sellers, on the other hand, more often initiate trades and therefore consume liquidity. The greater 
                                                 
9 Statistical tests (unreported, but available on request) of the differences between short-sale and long-sale seller-
initiation percentages show that the differences are significant at the 1% level. 
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aggressiveness of long sellers dovetails with recent evidence that long sales depress prices more 
than short sales (Bailey and Zheng, 2010; and Shkilko et al., 2010) and that short sellers often 
choose to provide liquidity to impatient buyers (Diether et al., 2009b; and Comerton-Forde et al., 
2011). 
Our finding that the Lee-Ready algorithm classifies close to 43% of short volume in 
NASDAQ pilot stocks as seller-initiated is consistent with Asquith et al.’s (2010) finding of 42% 
to 47% seller initiation in their sample of NASDAQ pilot stocks (their Table 3, page 166). For 
non-pilot stocks, the Lee-Ready algorithm classifies 43% to 45% of short volume as seller-
initiated in our sample, whereas Asquith et al. report 37% to 39% in their sample. As mentioned 
earlier, we do not expect our estimates for non-pilot stocks to match those in Asquith et al. 
because our sample is focused on INET trades, and INET did not strictly enforce the bid price 
test for non-pilot stocks during this period. 
Tests of the differences between the pilot and non-pilot seller-initiated percentages show that 
the differences are statistically insignificant in both sample months and overall.10 In other words, 
short sellers in pilot stocks are not more aggressive than short sellers in non-pilot stocks in our 
sample. Because the two samples yield identical inference, we combine them into one 200-stock 
sample in the tests that follow.11  
 
3.2 Classification at the trade level  
That the Lee-Ready algorithm generally classifies short sales and long sales accurately at the 
daily aggregation level is encouraging, but the daily findings may obscure misclassifications of 
                                                 
10 For brevity, we do not report the tests of pilot versus non-pilot stock differences in Table 3. These results are 
available on request from the authors. 
11 In the regression analyses in Section 4, we distinguish between pilot and non-pilot stocks by including a pilot 
indicator, in case differences become apparent in a multivariate setting. 
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individual trades if they offset each other.  For example, if 25% of true buyer-initiated trades are 
erroneously classified as seller-initiated, while 25% of true seller-initiated trades are erroneously 
classified as buyer-initiated, the accuracy of the Lee-Ready estimates would appear high at the 
daily level even though many individual trades were misclassified. To determine to what extent 
the Lee-Ready algorithm’s high daily accuracy carries through to the more granular level, we 
examine the frequency of misclassification of individual trades.  
In Table 4, we compare the true initiator for each trade with the classification provided by the 
Lee-Ready algorithm. In this table, we use contemporaneous trades and quotes to make the 
results comparable to our analysis in Table 3 and to most of the current literature. We conduct a 
series of robustness checks using lags of quotes later in this section. 
Nearly 32% of short sales are misclassified by the Lee-Ready algorithm in our sample: 
14.8% of true seller-initiated short trades are misclassified as buyer-initiated by Lee-Ready, and 
17% of true buyer-initiated short sales are misclassified as seller-initiated. Similarly, Lee-Ready 
misclassifies about 31% of long sales, with 15.3% of long seller-initiated trades misclassified as 
buys and 15.5% of long buyer-initiated trades misclassified as sells. These misclassification rates 
are about double those found by Finucane (2000) and Odders-White (2000) for NYSE 
transactions from the early 1990s. Odders-White reports that nearly 15% of trades were 
misclassified by Lee-Ready: 7.6% of true sells were classified as buys, and 7.4% of true buys 
were classified as sells (her Table 2, Panel C, page 267). 
[Table 4 Here] 
Our results may appear surprising to readers who expect that in a fully electronic market like 
INET, the Lee-Ready algorithm should be able to determine a trade’s direction with near-perfect 
accuracy. Indeed, in a hypothetical purely electronic limit order market, in which (i) all orders 
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are publicly displayed, (ii) the inside quotes always match the NBBO, (iii) time clocks at every 
NBBO contributor are perfectly synchronized, and (iv) new orders never arrive simultaneously, 
the Lee-Ready logic should lead to very precise estimates. Every incoming marketable order 
would execute against either the best bid or the best offer, and comparing the resulting 
transaction price to the prevailing inside quotes would perfectly identify trade direction.12  
We note that INET differs from the ideal market assumptions in several ways. First, hidden 
orders are allowed, and one cannot see hidden orders in the INET data until and unless they are 
executed. Second, INET traders are not market makers and thus are not obligated to post two-
sided quotes at all times.13 Third, Reg NMS was not in effect in 2005, so INET was not required 
to abide by the trade-through rule. Fourth, time clocks among NBBO-contributing markets are 
not perfectly synchronized, and finally, multiple trades can arrive at INET simultaneously. All of 
these imperfections relative to the ideal market create the environment in which the Lee-Ready 
algorithm performs less than perfectly.14 
Given the imperfect performance of the Lee-Ready algorithm on the trade level, we examine 
whether the trade and firm characteristics that have been shown to affect misclassification rates 
are disproportionally affecting trade identification in our sample. The results in Table 5 suggest 
that misclassifications generally follow patterns that are similar to those found by Odders-White 
(2000). Specifically, misclassifications are highest at the spread midpoint (Panel A), for stocks 
with more transactions (Panel C), and for larger firms (Panel D). The only notable difference is 
that our sample exhibits higher misclassification rates for large trades (Panel B), whereas 
Odders-White finds higher misclassification rates for small trades. We verify our results using 
                                                 
12 We thank the referee for suggesting this perspective.  
13 Chakrabarty, Corwin, and Panayides (2011) document that INET often does not post two-sided quotes.  
14 Chakrabarty et al. (2007) come to similar conclusions about error rates in classifying INET trades. Holden and 
Jacobsen (2011) draw attention to issues in determining the NBBO that arise from time stamp differences. 
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two trade-size cutoffs: 300 shares, which is approximately the mean trade size in our sample (and 
equal to the cutoff that Odders-White uses), and 100 shares, which is the median trade size in our 
sample. Both size cutoffs show higher misclassification rates for larger trades. Although this 
switch to higher misclassification of large rather than small trades is interesting, it cannot explain 
the overall increase in trade misclassification since the early 1990s, as the proportion of large 
trades has fallen over time.15  
A new development since the 1990s is the introduction of hidden orders on ECNs such as 
INET. The misclassification frequencies for trades executed against hidden orders are between 
30% and 32%, and misclassification frequencies for trades executed against displayed orders are 
between 31% and 32% (Panel E). We note that the difference in misclassification rates between 
displayed and hidden orders is not large enough to explain the increase in trade misclassification 
over time. It appears that the significant increase in misclassification frequency since the early 
1990s is driven by an increase in misclassifications across the board, rather than a major shift 
towards the types of trades that are more often misclassified. 
[Table 5 Here] 
A notable difference between our analysis and earlier studies of trade misclassification, such 
as Odders-White (2000), is that prior to 1998 most researchers using the Lee-Ready algorithm 
compare trades to quotes that are in effect a minimum of five seconds before the transaction is 
reported. In contrast, our Table 4 follows the current convention of a zero-second lag between 
quotes and trades. To facilitate comparison with the earlier studies, we next calculate 
misclassification frequencies using one- through five-second lags between quotes and trades.16  
                                                 
15 More than half of the trades are over 300 shares in Odders-White’s (2000) sample, versus less than a quarter of 
the trades in our sample.  
16 Lee and Ready (1991) propose the five-second quote lag to account for quotes being  updated before the trades 
that triggered them were reported, because at the time of their study quotes were updated on a computer while trades 
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The results in Table 6 suggest that introducing a quote lag reduces the incidence of 
misclassification. The total misclassification percentage drops to 21.4% for short sales using a 
one-second lag (Panel A), then rises monotonically to 23.6% for short sales using a five-second 
lag (Panel E). A similar pattern obtains for long sales. This analysis suggests that for trade-level 
classification, lagging quotes by at least one second is better than using contemporaneous quotes 
in the Lee-Ready algorithm.17 This result is consistent with the argument in Peterson and Sirri 
(2003), who note that using the NBBO quotes contemporaneous with the trade instead of the 
NBBO at order submission will cause the Lee-Ready algorithm to misclassify some trades, and 
that the degree of misclassification will depend on the time that the order takes to execute. 
[Table 6 Here] 
Although lagging the quotes reduces the misclassification frequency at the trade level, Table 
7 shows that it does not improve Lee-Ready’s accuracy once the classifications are aggregated to 
the daily level, because most of the misclassified buys and misclassified sells offset each other. 
In our sample, the daily averages are closest to the true values when no lag is used, but most of 
the Lee-Ready estimates based on one- to five-second quote lags produce daily seller-initiation 
percentages that are economically similar to the no-lag estimates and the true seller-initiation 
percentages. 
[Table 7 Here] 
In summary, analysis of order data suggests that the Lee-Ready algorithm misclassifies more 
than 30% of trades at the trade level. Because misclassification rates are not biased towards buys 
                                                                                                                                                             
were entered manually. Bessembinder (2003) finds that by 1998, making no allowance for trade reporting lags is 
preferred to a five-second lag. Vergote (2005) reports that a two-second delay is optimal, while Piwowar and Wei 
(2006) suggest that a one-second lag produces superior trade direction estimates. 
17 Analyses of trade misclassification frequencies by characteristics reveal similar relations for the Lee-Ready 
algorithm using one- to five-second quote lags as for the Lee-Ready algorithm using contemporaneous quotes (as in 
Table 5). These results are available from the authors on request. 
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or sells, the misclassified trades cancel each other out at the daily aggregation level. Further, 
introducing a one-second lag in quotes reduces the trade-level misclassification to less than 22%, 
while lagging quotes does not result in economically significant changes in the accuracy of daily 
aggregates. 
 
4. Consequences of trade misclassification in analyzing short and long seller aggressiveness  
A natural question is whether trade misclassification at the daily or intraday level affects the 
inferences drawn from multivariate studies of trader behavior. In the regression models that 
follow, we use both the true aggressiveness from INET order data and the Lee-Ready estimates. 
If the Lee-Ready estimates of trade initiation are adequate substitutes for the true trade initiation 
derived from order data, inference will be similar for models using the true aggressiveness and 
the Lee-Ready estimates.  
The analysis in Section 3.1 indicates that short sellers are less aggressive than long sellers. 
About 43% of daily short sales are seller-initiated, while about 55% of daily long sales are seller-
initiated. Yet short sellers are often vilified in the media. One possible explanation is that 
although they are less aggressive than long sellers in general, short sellers are particularly 
aggressive when their activities are most detrimental. To investigate this possibility, we move to 
a multivariate setting and examine when short sellers and long sellers are most aggressive.   
One challenge for our analysis is that the literature lacks a theoretical model of short sellers’ 
day-to-day behavior. In the absence of a theoretical foundation, recent empirical studies have 
relied on various sets of explanatory variables; however, there is little consensus on the set of 
covariates to include.18 The structure and focus of our study suggest that the model of Diether et 
                                                 
18 For example, Diether et al. (2009b) model short selling as a function of returns, order imbalances, volatility, and 
spreads; Christophe, Ferri, and Hsieh (2010) include prices, returns, and momentum; and Massoud, Nandi, 
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al. (2009b) is most suitable for our purposes. The panel structure of their dataset is similar to 
ours, and our focus on short and long sellers’ aggressiveness is compatible with Diether et al.’s 
focus on short-seller liquidity provision.  
 We examine how seller aggressiveness, measured by the percentage of trades that are seller-
initiated, changes as a function of the variables that Diether et al. (2009b) identify as 
determinants of short selling activity. One hypothesis is that short and long sellers are less 
aggressive when returns are positive and when a stock has a positive buy-sell order imbalance 
because sellers act as voluntary liquidity providers to more aggressive buyers. Conversely, when 
returns and order imbalances are negative, sellers may switch to liquidity-demanding strategies. 
This hypothesis implies a negative relation between seller aggressiveness and returns or order 
imbalances. Another hypothesis consistent with Diether et al. (2009b) is that sellers may act as 
opportunistic risk bearers during periods of increased uncertainty, when asymmetric information 
drives spreads wider or when intraday volatility is higher. If so, we would expect to see a 
negative relation between seller aggressiveness and spreads or volatility, as short sellers would 
be providing liquidity during periods of increased uncertainty, thus bearing risk. 
 
4.1 Aggressiveness at the daily level 
Equation (2) includes our variables of interest and control variables in a panel regression 
specification: 
ܵܫ௜,௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௧ ൅ ߚଶܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௧ିହ,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଷܱݎ݀݁ݎܫܾ݈݉ܽܽ݊ܿ݁௜,௧ା ൅                               (2) 
ߚସܱݎ݀݁ݎܫܾ݈݉ܽܽ݊ܿ݁௜,௧ିହ,௧ିଵା ൅ ߚହܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀௜,௧ ൅ ߚ଺ܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ௜,௧ ൅             
ߚ଻ܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ௜,௧ିହ,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ଼ܵܫ௜,௧ିହ,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଽܶݑݎ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ௜,௧ିହ,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଵ଴݈ܲ݅݋ݐ௜ ൅ 
                                                                                                                                                             
Saunders, and Song (2011) use an extended set of variables including returns, sales growth, institutional ownership, 
and a number of accounting and loan characteristics. 
 20 
∑ ߠ௞ܵݐ݋ܿ݇ܦݑ݉݉ݕ௞,௜ଵଽଽ௞ୀଵ ൅ ∑ ߜ௠ܦܽݕܦݑ݉݉ݕ௠,௧ସଶ௠ୀଵ ൅ ߝ௜,௧, 
where SIi,t is the percentage of sales that are seller-initiated in stock i , i א {1,2, …, 200}, on day 
t, t א {1,2, …, 43}, measured using either the true data or the Lee-Ready method.19 Returni,t is 
the return on stock i on day t; Returni,t-5,t-1 is the cumulative return on stock i over the previous 
five days. Order imbalance is defined as the buy volume minus sell volume divided by total 
volume, with buy and sell volumes determined from INET data. OrderImbalance+i,t is equal to 
the order imbalance in stock i on day t if the order imbalance is greater than zero, else zero. We 
focus on the positive range of order imbalances to be consistent with Diether et al. (2009b). 
OrderImbalance+i,t-5,t-1 is defined analogously using the previous five-day average of the order 
imbalance. Spreadi,t is the percentage effective spread of stock i on day t, computed as twice the 
difference between the trade price and the midpoint of the best bid and ask quotes divided by the 
quote midpoint, times an indicator equal to +1 (-1) for buyer-initiated (seller-initiated) trades, as 
determined from INET order data. Volatilityi,t is the difference between the high and low price of 
stock i on day t, divided by the high price;20 Volatilityi,t-5,t-1 is the average of Volatilityi,t over the 
previous five days. Turnoveri,t-5,t-1 is the average daily share volume in stock i over the previous 
five days, included to account for autocorrelation in volume. In addition, we control for the 
autocorrelation in the dependent variable by including its lag. Piloti is equal to one if stock i is a 
Reg SHO pilot stock, else zero; we include the pilot variable in case the multivariate framework 
reveals differences in seller aggressiveness that were not observable in our initial tests (Table 3). 
StockDummyk,i is an indicator variable equal to one if observation SIi,t is for stock k, else zero, to 
                                                 
19 We present the regression results using the seller-initiated percentage as the dependent variable for ease of 
economic interpretation. All results are robust to an alternative specification in which the dependent variable is 
defined as the log odds ratio of the seller-initiation percentage to address the limited nature of the dependent 
variable. Results of regressions using the log odds ratio are available from the authors on request.  
20 We use this definition of volatility for consistency with Diether et al. (2009b); dividing by the average price or 
closing price yields identical inference.  
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implement stock fixed effects. DayDummym,t is an indicator variable equal to one if observation 
SIi,t is on day m, else zero, to implement day fixed effects. For estimation purposes, we suppress 
one stock dummy and one day dummy because the model contains an intercept. 
Table 8 contains the results of panel regressions using subsets of explanatory variables in 
Equation (2). Because returns and order imbalances are positively correlated (correlation of 0.16, 
significant at the 1% level), including them in the same regression specification may introduce 
multicollinearity and make the coefficient estimates difficult to interpret. Furthermore, there is 
likely to be a mechanical relation between order imbalances and seller aggressiveness: A higher 
positive order imbalance naturally implies that sellers have less need to initiate trades and are 
more often providing liquidity to eager buyers. To lessen the potential impact of these issues, we 
estimate two specifications for each dependent variable: without order imbalance variables (odd-
numbered specifications in Table 8) and with return variables replaced by order imbalance 
variables (even-numbered specifications in Table 8). We are concerned about both serial 
correlation and cross-correlation, so we estimate standard errors that are clustered by both 
calendar day and stock (Thompson, 2011).  
 [Table 8 Here] 
Specification 1 in Table 8 shows that when returns are positive, short sellers are less aggressive, 
initiating a smaller percentage of trades, and when returns are negative, short sellers are more 
aggressive.21 In terms of economic magnitude, the coefficient on same-day return, Returni,t, 
implies that a one percentage point positive (negative) return results in a 1.45 percentage point 
drop (increase) in the short-seller aggressiveness. This is consistent with our hypothesis that 
when prices are rising, buyers are more aggressive, and thus sellers can act as passive liquidity 
                                                 
21 Dropping lagged returns from the analysis does not affect the coefficient estimates on contemporaneous returns; 
these results are available on request from authors.  
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providers, relying on limit orders and leading to a lower seller-initiation percentage. Conversely, 
when prices are falling, short sellers may rely less on limit orders if they seek speedy executions. 
In most specifications, short sellers appear less aggressive when spreads are wider, consistent 
with the hypothesis that they act as opportunistic risk bearers, while the coefficient estimates on 
volatility are mostly insignificant. Specification 5 in Table 8 shows that like short sellers, long 
sellers are less aggressive when returns are positive. In contrast to short sellers, long sellers 
appear more aggressive when spreads are wider, but only when we use true trade initiation 
(specification 5 in Table 8). 
We emphasize that although short sellers demand more liquidity in down markets, our results 
do not necessarily imply that short sellers deliberately push prices down. Notably, we obtain 
similar aggressiveness results for long sellers (specification 5). Although the coefficient 
estimates are smaller for long sales than for short sales, multivariate tests show that the 
differences between these coefficients are not statistically significant.22 Thus the data imply that 
there is no difference between short and long sellers’ aggressiveness in up or down markets. In 
this light, the negative reputation of short sellers remains puzzling. 
Specifications 2 and 6 in Table 8 show that replacing returns with positive order imbalances 
leads to similar inference. When a stock has a large positive order imbalance, short sellers and 
long sellers are less aggressive. The mechanical link between order imbalance and seller 
aggressiveness likely explains the higher explanatory power in the order-imbalance regressions 
(e.g., R-squared of 34.47% in specification 2 versus 13.46% in specification 1).   
                                                 
22 In these tests, we include short sellers and long sellers together in a multivariate model similar to that in equation 
(2). To test for significance of differences, we include a dummy variable that indicates observations corresponding 
to short sales as opposed to long sales. The interaction of this dummy with the return variable has an insignificant 
coefficient, suggesting that the difference between short and long sellers’ aggressiveness is not statistically 
significant. 
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Using Lee-Ready estimates for seller initiation percentages leads to similar inferences as 
using true seller initiation percentages (see specifications 1 and 2 versus 3 and 4, or 5 and 6 
versus 7 and 8). Both the True and the Lee-Ready measures imply that positive returns and 
positive order imbalances have a significantly negative effect on seller aggressiveness for both 
short and long sales; the main difference is that the coefficient estimates are larger when we use 
true seller initiation. This difference in the coefficients is statistically significant for both short 
and long sales. True initiation percentages also result in a better model fit. Using Lee-Ready 
estimates to determine trade direction appears to add noise but does not change the qualitative 
inference of our analyses. 
 
4.2 Aggressiveness at the intraday level 
Although the results in Table 8 are informative, we recognize that they may be affected by 
endogeneity. Of particular concern are the relations between trade aggressiveness, returns, and 
volatility, which may be changing in a systematic way and may not be successfully captured by 
the daily aggregates in equation (2).23 One way to alleviate potential endogeneity is to re-
estimate equation (2) on the intraday level, relying on short-term lags of the dependent variables. 
To ensure that all sample stocks have a sufficient number of observations for intraday analysis, 
we divide each trading day into 30-minute intervals and use explanatory variables from the 
preceding interval to draw inferences.24 Correlations between returns and order imbalances and 
between order imbalances and dependent variables remain high on the intraday level (e.g., 
correlation between returns and order imbalances is 0.2, significant at 1% level), therefore we 
                                                 
23 For example, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005, 2009) theorize that aggressive selling that causes significant 
price changes may, under certain conditions, induce even more selling and further price changes, often accompanied 
by substantial volatility. 
24 We exclude the first 30 minutes of each trading day to avoid using explanatory variables from the prior day. As a 
result we have twelve 30-minute intraday observations for each stock on each day.  
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follow the approach adopted in Table 8 and use returns in the odd-numbered specifications and 
order imbalances in the even-numbered specifications. In addition, we exclude the lagged 
dependent variable because of its correlation with other explanatory variables. Finally, we use 
two versions of the Lee-Ready estimates, with one-second and zero-second lags, to see whether 
lagging the quote improves Lee-Ready results at the half-hourly level of aggregation. Equation 
(3) includes our variables of interest and control variables in a panel regression specification: 
ܵܫ௜,௧,௣ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௧,௣ିଵ ൅ ߚଶܱݎ݀݁ݎܫܾ݈݉ܽܽ݊ܿ݁௜,௧,௣ିଵା ൅ ߚଷܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀௜,௧,௣ିଵ ൅              (3) 
ߚସܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ௜,௧,௣ିଵ ൅ ߚହܶݑݎ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ௜,௧,௣ିଵ ൅ ߚ଺݈ܲ݅݋ݐ௜ ൅ 
                            ∑ ߠ௞ଵଽଽ௞ୀଵ ܵݐ݋ܿ݇ܦݑ݉݉ݕ௞,௜  ൅  ∑ ߜ௠ܦܽݕܦݑ݉݉ݕ௠,௧ସଶ௠ୀଵ ൅
                            ∑ ߛ௡ଵଵ௡ୀଵ ܫ݊ݐ݁ݎݒ݈ܽܦݑ݉݉ݕ௡,௣ ൅ ߝ௜,௧,௣,  
where i refers to the stock, i א {1,2, …, 200}, t refers to the day, t א {1,2, …, 43}, and p refers to 
the 30-minute intraday period, p א {1,2, …, 12}. IntervalDummyn,p is an indicator variable equal 
to one if observation SIi,t,p is in intraday period n, else zero, to account for intraday period fixed 
effects. All other variables are defined similarly to those in equation (2) but are computed over 
30-minute intraday intervals. For estimation purposes, we suppress one stock dummy, one day 
dummy, and one interval dummy because the model contains an intercept. Standard errors are 
clustered by calendar day and stock. 
The results of the intraday analyses, reported in Table 9, generally confirm our earlier 
findings. Aggressiveness of both short and long sellers declines when lagged intraday returns are 
positive and increases when lagged returns are negative.25 Additionally, positive order 
imbalances reduce aggressiveness of both seller types. Short sellers provide greater liquidity 
                                                 
25 The differences between return coefficients in the short sale and long sale specifications are statistically 
insignificant. 
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when spreads are wider, but this effect does not extend to long sellers. Finally, volatility remains 
a mostly insignificant factor for short and long sellers’ aggressiveness. 
[Table 9 Here] 
As in the daily analyses, analyses using the true and Lee-Ready dependent variables yield 
similar inference in terms of the signs of the coefficients, although coefficient values differ. The 
coefficients from one-second lag estimates are closer to the coefficients of the true estimates than 
the coefficients from zero-second lag estimates are, confirming our recommendation that 
researchers should consider using one-second lags when applying the Lee-Ready algorithm to 
intraday analyses. We caution that the distortions caused by zero-second lags may have larger 
impact in a more granular trade-by-trade analyses; it is possible that our 30-minute aggregation 
period is long enough to allow misclassifications on both sides to partly offset each other. In 
addition, we note that our results are obtained from the INET order data and may apply 
differently for markets with different structures. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This study examines the success rates of the Lee-Ready trade classification algorithm for 
short and long sales, using true trade initiation data from INET. We show that despite recent 
criticism, the algorithm performs well and correctly identifies most short sales as buyer-initiated 
and most long sales as seller-initiated. In daily aggregates, Lee-Ready misclassification rates are 
near zero. This result validates a number of recent day-level studies that use the algorithm to sign 
trades. 
Despite the success of the algorithm at the daily level, we find that it performs less than 
ideally at the more granular trade level, misclassifying more than 30% of trades. Because 
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misclassification is evenly split between buyer-initiated and seller-initiated trades, the errors 
offset each other in daily aggregates. The increase in misclassification in our more recent sample 
is substantial, compared to the 15% misclassification rate reported in samples from the early 
1990s. We further show that determinants of misclassification identified in prior research still 
matter, yet none of them has changed enough to explain the increase in misclassification rates 
over time. 
In our main results, we follow the current convention of using contemporaneous quotes and 
trades to determine trade direction. When we instead use a one-second quote lag, the 
misclassification rate declines by one third, to about 21%. Our results suggest that researchers 
who use the Lee-Ready algorithm at the trade level in recent samples may benefit from lagging 
quotes. 
Finally, we show that using Lee-Ready estimates leads to similar inferences as using true 
trade initiation data in a study of short and long sellers’ behavior. We show that both long sellers 
and short sellers provide liquidity in up markets and demand liquidity in down markets. 
Moreover, short sellers’ order aggressiveness is statistically indistinguishable from long sellers’ 
aggressiveness. Our findings are particularly notable in light of media and regulators’ attention to 
short sellers’ allegedly aggressive trading practices and suggest that the widespread suspicion of 
short sellers may not be warranted.  
Our results are important on three levels. First, we confirm that using the Lee-Ready 
algorithm to sign trades results in estimates that are nearly indistinguishable from true initiation 
rates at the daily level, removing the cloud of suspicion about the algorithm’s reliability in day-
level studies. Second, we caution that using the Lee-Ready algorithm in intraday studies without 
lagging quotes may result in misclassification rates that are considerably higher than those 
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obtained in the 1990s. To reduce misclassification in intraday studies, we suggest lagging quotes 
by one second. Finally, we shed new light on short and long sellers’ aggressiveness while 
showing that both true trade initiation and Lee-Ready estimates of trade initiation lead to similar 
inference in this setting. 
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Table 1: Sample Descriptive Statistics
 
 
  Pilot Non‐Pilot p‐value Pilot Non‐Pilot p‐value
Price ($) 26.98 27.78 0.1341 23.81 25.94 0.1933
Market capitalization ($millions) 2040.47 2861.81 0.1887 730.17 713.19 0.7644
Share volume (thousands) 1087.50 1353.76 0.2298 260.12 251.26 0.7642
Dollar volume ($millions) 18.82 28.51 0.1825 4.78 4.65 0.4841
Number of trades 878 1,079 0.1063 405 423 0.9204
Number of short‐sale trades 309 388 0.1206 146 133 0.4841
Number of shares shorted 96,586 138,592 0.0840 22,658 21,041 1.0000
% Shares shorted 28.0% 28.1% 0.9146 28.8% 28.7% 0.7644
Quoted spread (cents) 7.01 7.13 0.1449 4.42 4.76 0.2056
% Quoted spread (bps) 18.22 17.64 0.0150 12.14 12.24 0.0073
Effective Spread (cents) 2.92 2.86 0.3483 1.40 1.47 0.9878
% Effective Spread (bps) 7.72 7.10 0.0482 4.18 3.96 0.0169
Means Medians
Descriptive statistics are presented for the sample of 100 Reg SHO pilot stocks and 100 non‐pilot stocks matched on 
price, market capitalization, and share volume.  Closing Price  and Market capitalization  are as of May 31, 2005;  Share 
volume  and Dollar volume  are averages for May 2005; all other statistics are based on the two‐month sample period, 
June and December 2005. % Shares shorted  is the ratio of the number of shares shorted to total volume. Quoted spread 
is the difference between the best ask and best bid quotes; Effective spread  is twice the difference of the trade price 
minus the quote midpoint at the time of the trade, times an indicator equal to +1 (‐1) for buyer‐initiated (seller‐initiated) 
trades, with trade initiator determined from order data. Percentage spreads are calculated as the effective or quoted 
spread in cents divided by the quote midpoint. Averages are calculated for each stock across all sample days, and cross‐
sectional means and medians of the time‐series averages are reported in this table. P‐values are based on t ‐tests for 
mean differences and Wilcoxon signed rank tests for median differences. Data are from CRSP, TAQ, and the INET order 
book. 
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Table 2: INET's Share of Trading Volume for Sample Stocks
 
 
 
% of Total 
Volume
% of Short 
Sale 
Volume
Average 
Short Sale 
Trade Size*
% of Long 
Sale 
Volume
Average 
Long Sale 
Trade Size*
Number of 
Sample 
Stocks 
Traded
% of Total 
Volume
% of Short 
Sale 
Volume
Average 
Short Sale 
Trade Size*
% of Long 
Sale 
Volume
Average 
Long Sale 
Trade Size*
Number of 
Sample 
Stocks 
Traded
NASDAQ 53.8% 48.0% 288 57.4% 328 100 54.8% 47.8% 317 59.1% 315 100
INET 25.6% 27.9% 175 24.3% 179 100 24.8% 27.4% 181 23.3% 182 100
ARCA 20.4% 24.1% 181 18.0% 188 100 20.3% 24.8% 187 17.5% 192 100
CHICAGO 0.8% 0.0% 123 1.2% 18,632 16 0.3% 0.0% 113 0.5% 6,458 15
ADF 0.3% 0.3% 197 0.3% 368 14 0.1% 0.1% 114 0.1% 181 22
AMEX 0.0% 0.0% 1,291 0.1% 7,218 8 0.1% 0.1% 947 0.0% 1,013 9
Panel B: June 2005
NASDAQ 54.9% 48.5% 298 59.0% 339 100 55.0% 48.0% 335 59.6% 344 100
INET 23.8% 26.1% 178 22.6% 180 100 24.0% 26.4% 186 22.4% 184 100
ARCA 21.1% 25.3% 181 18.2% 186 100 21.0% 25.5% 191 17.9% 192 100
CHICAGO 0.4% 0.0% 62 0.7% 7,441 12 0.2% 0.0% 0 0.3% 8,695 14
ADF 0.2% 0.3% 262 0.2% 233 21 0.2% 0.1% 182 0.2% 271 25
AMEX 0.0% 0.0% 1,017 0.0% 788 8 0.1% 0.1% 1,103 0.1% 435 10
Panel C: December 2005
NASDAQ 55.7% 50.1% 281 59.4% 314 100 56.9% 49.5% 311 61.7% 322 100
INET 24.6% 26.4% 175 23.4% 169 100 24.0% 26.4% 184 22.7% 174 100
ARCA 19.5% 23.4% 184 16.9% 184 100 18.8% 24.0% 193 15.4% 189 100
CHICAGO 0.2% 0.0% 10 0.4% 9,890 36 0.2% 0.0% 54 0.4% 17,602 26
ADF 0.6% 0.5% 317 0.6% 402 24 0.8% 0.3% 374 1.0% 510 19
AMEX 0.0% 0.0% 426 0.0% 311 8 0.0% 0.0% 267 0.0% 396 10
* The large average trade sizes on Chicago and AMEX are driven by a few outlier trades reported on exchanges that attract little trading volume overall in the sample stocks. 
Panel A: May 2005
Pilot Non‐Pilot
Total Volume , Short Sale Volume ,  Average Short Sale Trade Size,  Long Sale Volume , and Average Long Sale Trade Size  are calculated for each stock/month/exchange. Each exchange's volume 
percentage is calculated as the ratio of its volume to marketwide volume per stock. Cross‐sectional series averages for each period are reported in the table below for the 100 Reg SHO pilot stocks 
(left panel) and 100 non‐pilot stocks (right panel) matched on price, market capitalization, and share volume. For exchanges that do not trade all 100 stocks, we report the mean percentage across 
the subsets of pilot and non‐pilot stocks traded on that exchange; because not all exchanges trade all sample stocks, percentages do not sum to 100% across exchanges. Panel A contains the means 
for May 2005, the pre‐period used for creating the matched sample; panels B and C present the means for June and December 2005, the sample months used for analysis. ADF  is FINRA's 
Alternative Display Facility. Data are from the Reg SHO database and TAQ. 
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Table 3: Seller‐initiated Sales Determined from Order Data versus the Lee‐Ready Algorithm 
 
 
 
  %Trades %Shares %Trades %Shares %Trades %Shares %Trades %Shares %Trades %Shares %Trades %Shares
 
June 41.7% 42.7% 42.2% 42.8% 0.3104 0.7999 42.4% 42.9% 42.7% 43.1% 0.6431 0.7631
 
December 43.6% 43.8% 43.4% 43.8% 0.8340 0.9538 44.6% 44.4% 44.8% 44.8% 0.9666 0.4068
Combined Period 42.6% 43.3% 42.8% 43.3% 0.6675 0.9279 43.0% 43.6% 43.5% 43.9% 0.3978 0.3868
June 54.9% 56.2% 55.1% 56.2% 0.4883 0.9789 53.9% 54.7% 54.6% 55.3% 0.1566 0.1495
December 54.4% 55.0% 54.4% 55.2% 0.8912 0.7415 53.6% 54.3% 53.9% 54.5% 0.4458 0.7681
Combined Period 54.7% 55.6% 54.8% 55.7% 0.7366 0.8372 53.8% 54.4% 54.3% 54.9% 0.1774 0.1340
Non‐Pilot
True  LR‐estimated
True ‐ LR Estimated
p‐value of difference
This table reports the percentage of short sales (Panel A) and long sales (Panel B) that are seller‐initiated, based on the order data associated with each trade (True ) and based 
on the Lee‐Ready algorithm (LR‐estimated ), for the 100 Reg SHO pilot stocks (left panel) and 100 non‐pilot stocks (right panel) matched on price, market capitalization, and 
share volume. Averages are calculated for each stock over the time period, and cross‐sectional means are reported in the table. P‐values for the True‐LR Difference  are based 
on double‐sided t‐tests of the differences. The analysis periods are June 2005,  December 2005, and the two months combined.  Data are from the Reg SHO database, TAQ, and 
INET order book. 
Pilot
Panel B: Long Sales
Panel A: Short Sales
True  LR‐estimated
True ‐ LR Estimated
p‐value of difference
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Table 4: Trade‐by‐Trade Classification Performance of Lee‐Ready Algorithm with No Quote Lag
 
 
  Number Percent Number Percent
Short Sales Lee‐Ready method: Buy 1,159,336   38.9 439,885     14.8 31.8
Lee‐Ready method: Sell 505,973       17.0 875,463     29.4
Long Sales Lee‐Ready method: Buy 1,661,988   30.9 822,834     15.3 30.8
Lee‐Ready method: Sell 837,237       15.5 2,064,639 38.3
True Buy True Sell Total 
Misclassification %
This table presents a comparison of the true classification (buy or sell, determined from order data) to the classification 
from the Lee‐Ready algorithm, based on contemporaneous trades and quotes, on a trade‐by‐trade basis for the sample 
of 200 stocks. Each entry contains the number and percentage of transactions in the sample that fall into the respective 
category. Total Misclassification %  for each sample equals the percentage of true sells classified as buys plus the 
percentage of true buys classified as sells. Sample period is June and December 2005.  Data are from the Reg SHO 
database, TAQ, and INET order book. 
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Table 5: Trade‐by‐Trade Performance of Lee‐Ready Algorithm by Characteristics
Category Chi‐Square Stat
Number Percent Number Percent (p‐value)
Panel A: Transaction price in relation to quotes
Short Sales At or outside the quotes 1,558,070 71.2 629,602     28.8 46243.78
Inside the spread but non‐midpoint 373,338    63.7 212,992     36.3 (<.0001)
At the spread midpoint 103,391    50.0 103,264     50.0
Long Sales At or outside the quotes 2,862,793 72.7 1,073,075 27.3 107540.00
Inside the spread but non‐midpoint 681,022    62.8 404,037     37.2 (<.0001)
At the spread midpoint 182,812    50.0 182,959     50.0
Panel B: Trade size
Short Sales 300 shares or less 1,529,112 69.8 662,978     30.2 8481.18
301 shares or more 505,687    64.1 282,880     35.9 (<.0001)
100 shares or less 1,038,612 69.9 448,094     30.1 3475.29
101 shares or more 996,187    66.7 497,764     33.3 (<.0001)
Long Sales 300 shares or less 2,975,542 70.7 1,234,995 29.3 19592.07
301 shares or more 751,085    63.9 425,076     36.1 (<.0001)
100 shares or less 2,273,509 71.0 930,511     29.0 11679.95
101 shares or more 1,453,118 66.6 729,560     33.4 (<.0001)
Panel C: Trading frequency (number of transactions)
Short Sales 4000 or fewer 88,644      71.3 35,702       28.7 1648.66
4001 ‐ 10,000 249,636    70.6 104,123     29.4 (<.0001)
over 10,000 1,696,519 67.8 806,033     32.2
Long Sales 4000 or fewer 68,734      75.5 22,337       24.5 2601.92
4001 ‐ 10,000 234,481    71.4 93,962       28.6 (<.0001)
over 10,000 3,423,412 68.9 1,543,772 31.1
Panel D: Firm size
Short Sales Large (deciles 1‐5) 1,702,705 68.0 802,956     32.1 708.66
Small (deciles 6‐10) 332,094    69.9 142,902     30.1 (<.0001)
Long Sales Large (deciles 1‐5) 3,132,221 68.9 1,414,132 31.1 1124.20
Small (deciles 6‐10) 594,406    70.7 245,939     29.3 (<.0001)
Panel E: Order visibility
Short Sales Displayed  1,894,772 68.3 880,293     31.7 2.53
Hidden 140,027    68.1 65,565       31.9 (0.1115)
Long Sales Displayed  3,428,843 69.1 1,531,655 30.9 102.61
Hidden 297,784    69.9 128,416     30.1 (<.0001)
Correct Incorrect
This table contains a breakdown of the accuracy of the Lee‐Ready algorithm (based on contemporaneous trades and quotes) 
by trade and firm characteristics for the 200 sample stocks. Each row presents the number and percentage of transactions  in 
that category  that are correctly and incorrectly classified. Summing along each row provides the total number of transactions 
falling into the respective category.  (Percentages sum to 100% along each row.)  Summing down a "Number" column within 
a category (e.g., trade size) yields the total number of correctly classified and incorrectly classified transactions in the sample. 
Chi‐square statistics test the hypothesis that the frequency of misclassification is independent of the characteristic. Sample 
months are June and December 2005.  Data are from the Reg SHO database, TAQ, and INET order book. 
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Table 6: Trade‐by‐Trade Classification Performance of Lee‐Ready Algorithm with Different Quote Lags
 
 
  Number Percent Number Percent 
Panel A: Lee‐Ready with 1‐second lag between trade and quotes
Short Sales Lee‐Ready method: Buy 1,331,885 44.7 305,067     10.2 21.4
Lee‐Ready method: Sell 333,029     11.2 1,010,075 33.9
Long Sales Lee‐Ready method: Buy 1,893,007 35.2 564,494     10.5 21.8
Lee‐Ready method: Sell 605,747     11.3 2,322,337 43.1
Panel B: Lee‐Ready with 2‐second lag between trade and quotes
Short Sales Lee‐Ready method: Buy 1,320,120 44.3 312,164     10.5 22.1
Lee‐Ready method: Sell 344,609     11.6 1,002,808 33.7
Long Sales Lee‐Ready method: Buy 1,885,785 35.0 581,780     10.8 22.2
Lee‐Ready method: Sell 612,642     11.4 2,304,500 42.8
Panel C: Lee‐Ready with 3‐second lag between trade and quotes
Short Sales Lee‐Ready method: Buy 1,309,308 44.0 317,265     10.7 22.6
Lee‐Ready method: Sell 355,217     11.9 997,628     33.5
Long Sales Lee‐Ready method: Buy 1,877,014 34.9 593,747     11.0 22.5
Lee‐Ready method: Sell 621,179     11.5 2,292,255 42.6
Panel D: Lee‐Ready with 4‐second lag between trade and quotes
Short Sales Lee‐Ready method: Buy 1,300,136 43.6 324,811     10.9 23.1
Lee‐Ready method: Sell 364,219     12.2 990,009     33.2
Long Sales Lee‐Ready method: Buy 1,868,845 34.7 607,682     11.3 23.0
Lee‐Ready method: Sell 629,130     11.7 2,278,091 42.3
Panel E: Lee‐Ready with 5‐second lag between trade and quotes
Short Sales Lee‐Ready method: Buy 1,290,460 43.3 330,199     11.1 23.7
Lee‐Ready method: Sell 373,723     12.6 984,541     33.1
Long Sales Lee‐Ready method: Buy 1,859,485 34.5 617,411     11.5 23.4
Lee‐Ready method: Sell 638,244     11.9 2,268,104 42.1
This table presents a comparison of the true classification (buy or sell, determined from order data) to the classification from 
the Lee‐Ready algorithm on a trade‐by‐trade basis for the sample of 200 stocks. Each panel calculates the Lee‐Ready 
classifications using a different quote lag, from one to five seconds. Each entry contains the number and percentage of 
transactions in the sample that fall into the respective category. Total Misclassification %  for each sample equals the 
percentage of true sells classified as buys plus the percentage of true buys classified as sells. Sample period is June and 
December 2005.  Data are from the Reg SHO database, TAQ, and INET order book. 
True Buy True Sell Total 
Misclassification %
35
  
  %Trades %Shares %Trades %Shares %Trades %Shares
Short Sales True 42.9% 43.4%
Lee‐Ready estimated with 0‐second lag 43.8% 43.6% ‐0.9% ‐0.2% 0.4906 0.7822
Lee‐Ready estimated with 1‐second lag 41.8% 42.2% 1.1% 1.2% 0.2342 0.1613
Lee‐Ready estimated with 2‐second lag 41.8% 42.2% 1.1% 1.2% 0.2693 0.1971
Lee‐Ready estimated with 3‐second lag 42.1% 42.5% 0.8% 0.9% 0.5005 0.4772
Lee‐Ready estimated with 4‐second lag 42.1% 42.5% 0.8% 0.9% 0.5268 0.4762
Lee‐Ready estimated with 5‐second lag 42.3% 42.6% 0.6% 0.8% 0.6645 0.5169
Long Sales True 54.2% 55.0%
Lee‐Ready estimated with 0‐second lag 54.5% 55.3% ‐0.3% ‐0.3% 0.7512 0.7147
Lee‐Ready estimated with 1‐second lag 55.4% 56.3% ‐1.2% ‐1.3% 0.1937 0.1205
Lee‐Ready estimated with 2‐second lag 55.0% 55.9% ‐0.8% ‐0.9% 0.5610 0.5919
Lee‐Ready estimated with 3‐second lag 55.1% 56.0% ‐0.9% ‐1.0% 0.4769 0.3413
Lee‐Ready estimated with 4‐second lag 54.9% 55.8% ‐0.7% ‐0.8% 0.5351 0.5236
Lee‐Ready estimated with 5‐second lag 54.9% 55.8% ‐0.7% ‐0.8% 0.5521 0.5242
True ‐ LR Estimated
p‐value of differenceTrue ‐ LR Estimated
Table 7: Comparison of Daily Seller‐initiated Percentages, True and Lee‐Ready with 0‐ to 5‐second Quote Lags
This table presents a comparison of the true seller‐initiation percentages to those estimated from the Lee‐Ready algorithm, based on 
quote lags from zero to five seconds. Averages are calculated for each stock over the time period, and cross‐sectional means are 
reported in the table. P‐values for the True‐LR Difference  are based on double‐sided t‐tests of the differences. Sample period is June 
and December 2005.  Data are from the Reg SHO database, TAQ, and INET order book. 
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Table 8: Daily Regressions of Seller‐Initiated Percentages of Short and Long Sales
Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Returnt ‐1.45 ‐0.88 ‐1.19 ‐0.56
(‐9.0) (‐9.3) (‐8.4) (‐6.6)
Return t‐5,t‐1 ‐0.03 0.14 ‐0.03 0.05
(‐0.5) (3.4) (‐0.9) (1.6)
Order imbalance+t ‐0.56 ‐0.15 ‐0.68 ‐0.20
(‐35.7) (‐10.5) (‐69.2) (‐12.9)
Order imbalance+t‐5,t‐1 0.12 0.05 0.18 0.06
(3.9) (2.3) (8.7) (3.6)
Spreadt ‐4.62 ‐6.76 ‐6.85 ‐7.20 5.64 2.76 2.66 1.98
(‐1.8) (‐3.6) (‐3.0) (‐3.2) (2.5) (1.6) (1.0) (0.8)
Volatilityt ‐0.03 ‐0.33 0.18 0.02 ‐0.02 ‐0.31 0.06 ‐0.06
(‐0.2) (‐2.8) (1.6) (0.2) (‐0.2) (‐5.1) (0.6) (‐0.8)
Volatilityt‐5,t‐1 0.05 0.49 0.02 0.24 ‐0.04 0.40 ‐0.31 ‐0.13
(0.3) (3.0) (0.1) (1.8) (‐0.3) (3.1) (‐2.4) (‐1.1)
Turnovert‐5,t‐1 ‐0.42 ‐1.33 ‐0.41 ‐0.62 0.30 ‐0.91 0.13 ‐0.20
(‐2.1) (‐7.4) (‐4.1) (‐6.3) (2.3) (‐7.1) (1.2) (‐1.9)
Seller‐initiated %t‐5,t‐1 0.17 0.15 0.08 0.08 0.20 0.13 0.05 0.03
(7.4) (5.9) (3.7) (3.3) (9.2) (6.2) (2.2) (1.3)
Pilot ‐0.43 ‐1.01 0.06 ‐0.10 ‐0.26 ‐0.86 ‐0.06 ‐0.25
(‐1.6) (‐2.7) (0.1) (‐0.5) (‐1.4) (‐2.3) (‐0.4) (‐1.5)
Stock fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Day fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 8600 8600 8600 8600 8600 8600 8600 8600
R2demeaned 0.0495 0.2640 0.0245 0.0359 0.0547 0.5431 0.0595 0.1237
R2 0.1346 0.3447 0.1051 0.1168 0.1249 0.6052 0.1189 0.1820
The dependent variable is the True (order‐based) or Lee‐Ready Estimated Seller‐Initiated % , as indicated at the top of each column, 
for day t . Return t  is the stock's return on day t ; Return t‐5,t‐1   is the stock's return over the previous five days. Order imbalance + t  is 
equal to the daily buy‐sell order imbalance (as a % of daily volume) of the stock on day t  if the imbalance is greater than 0, else zero; 
Order imbalance + t‐5,t‐1  is defined analogously based on the average order imbalance over the prior five days. Spread t  is the 
percentage effective spread for the stock on day t . Volatility t  is the difference between the stock's high and low price on day t , 
divided by the high price; Volatility t‐5,t‐1  is the average volatility over the previous five days. Turnover t‐5,t‐1  is the log of the average 
daily share turnover of the stock over the previous five days. Seller‐initiated % t‐5,t‐1  is the average of the dependent variable over the 
previous five days. Pilot  is an indicator variable equal to one if the stock is a Reg SHO pilot stock, else zero.  Reported values of the 
Turnover  and Pilot  coefficient estimates are scaled by 100 for ease of reading. Regressions also include stock fixed effects  and day 
fixed effects. Sample comprises 100 Reg SHO pilot stocks and 100 non‐pilot stocks matched on price, market capitalization, and 
volume; analysis period is June and December 2005. T‐statistics, reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates, are robust to 
time‐series and cross‐sectional correlation. R 2 demeaned  is the reported R‐squared from a regression that demeans the data to 
implement the fixed effects, and R 2  is the reported R‐squared from a regression that explicitly includes the dummy variables to 
implement the fixed effects.
True Seller‐Initiated %
L‐R Estimated
Seller‐Initiated %
Short Sales Long Sales
True Seller‐Initiated %
L‐R Estimated
Seller‐Initiated %
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Table 9: Intraday Regressions of Seller‐Initiated Percentages of Short and Long Sales
Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Returnt‐1 ‐0.98 ‐1.13 ‐1.25 ‐0.92 ‐1.02 ‐1.16
(‐4.3) (‐5.9) (‐6.7) (‐4.5) (‐5.2) (‐5.7)
Order imbalance+t‐1 ‐0.17 ‐0.07 ‐0.04 ‐0.18 ‐0.08 ‐0.04
(‐24.4) (‐13.7) (‐7.7) (‐27.0) (‐13.9) (‐8.8)
Spreadt‐1 ‐4.11 ‐3.88 ‐3.48 ‐3.37 ‐2.66 ‐2.60 1.19 1.02 ‐0.67 ‐0.74 ‐0.08 ‐0.10
(‐2.8) (‐2.7) (‐2.2) (‐2.1) (‐2.1) (‐2.1) (1.1) (1.1) (‐0.6) (‐0.6) (‐0.1) (‐0.1)
Volatilityt‐1 ‐0.38 ‐0.60 ‐0.17 ‐0.30 0.21 0.12 0.00 ‐0.31 0.07 ‐0.09 0.27 0.16
(‐1.7) (‐2.5) (‐0.7) (‐1.2) (1.0) (0.6) (0.0) (‐1.3) (0.3) (‐0.4) (1.3) (0.8)
Turnovert‐1  0.05 ‐0.43 0.04 ‐0.18 0.09 ‐0.02 ‐0.07 ‐0.55 ‐0.10 ‐0.31 ‐0.12 ‐0.23
(0.6) (‐5.4) (0.6) (‐2.9) (1.7) (‐0.4) (‐0.7) (‐6.2) (‐1.2) (‐4.0) (‐1.8) (‐3.4)
Pilot 0.06 ‐0.21 0.06 ‐0.06 0.04 ‐0.02 0.07 ‐0.17 0.02 ‐0.08 0.01 ‐0.05
(0.3) (‐1.1) (0.4) (‐0.4) (0.8) (‐0.4) (1.1) (‐1.5) (0.3) (‐0.9) (0.1) (‐0.5)
Stock fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Day fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Interval fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 85790 85790 85790 85790 85790 85790 96127 96127 96127 96127 96127 96127
R2demeaned 0.0064 0.0289 0.0042 0.0086 0.0042 0.0052 0.0052 0.0399 0.0092 0.0163 0.0118 0.0134
R2 0.0341 0.0570 0.0251 0.0297 0.0235 0.0246 0.0228 0.0577 0.0209 0.0281 0.0231 0.0246
The table presents intraday regression results for short sales and long sales, using three different dependent variables. The dependent variable is the True  (order‐based) or Lee‐Ready 
Estimated  Seller‐Initiated % , using a 1‐second or 0‐second lag between quotes and trades, as indicated at the top of each column, for half‐hour interval t . Return t‐1  is the stock's return over 
the previous interval. Order imbalance + t‐1  is equal to the buy‐sell order imbalance (as a % of interval volume) of the stock in the previous interval if the imbalance is greater than 0, else 
zero. Spread t‐1  is the percentage effective spread for the stock in the previous interval. Volatility t‐1  is the difference between the stock's high and low price in the previous interval, divided 
by the high price. Turnover t‐1  is the log of the interval share turnover of the stock over the previous interval. Pilot  is an indicator variable equal to one if the stock is a Reg SHO pilot stock, 
else zero. Reported values of the Turnover  and Pilot  coefficient estimates are scaled by 100 for ease of reading. Regressions also include stock fixed effects, day fixed effects, and interval 
fixed effects. Sample comprises 100 Reg SHO pilot stocks and 100 non‐pilot stocks matched on price, market capitalization, and volume; analysis period is June and December 2005. T‐
statistics, reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates, are robust to time‐series and cross‐sectional correlation. R 2 demeaned  is the reported R‐squared from a regression that demeans 
the data to implement the fixed effects, and R 2  is the reported R‐squared from a regression that explicitly includes the dummy variables to implement the fixed effects.
L‐R Estimated  
Seller‐Initiated %, 
with 1‐second Lag
L‐R Estimated  
Seller‐Initiated %, 
with 0‐second Lag
Long Sales
True Seller‐Initiated %
L‐R Estimated  
Seller‐Initiated %, 
with 1‐second Lag
L‐R Estimated  
Seller‐Initiated %, 
with 0‐second Lag True Seller‐Initiated %
Short Sales
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Appendix: Percentage of Short Sales Matched to Order Data, by Look‐ahead/Look‐back Window
Look‐ahead/Look‐back Window in Seconds
Number 
of trades
Cumulative 
Percentage 
of Trades
Number of 
Shares
Cumulative 
Percentage 
of Shares
0 1,931,936 63.4% 661,629,954 64.5%
1 1,063,873 98.3% 349,322,163 98.5%
2 24,565 99.1% 6,823,601 99.2%
3 5,549 99.3% 1,875,787 99.3%
4 3,257 99.4% 1,017,027 99.4%
5 2,290 99.5% 764,346 99.5%
6 1,334 99.6% 400,841 99.6%
7 870 99.6% 327,443 99.6%
8 613 99.6% 184,019 99.6%
9 613 99.6% 213,062 99.6%
10 501 99.6% 155,037 99.6%
This table reports the match frequency of NSX short sales reported under Reg SHO to INET order data 
using a look‐ahead/look‐back windows from 0 seconds to +/‐ 10 seconds relative to the the time of the 
trade. Statistics are aggregated for 200 sample stocks in June and December 2005. Cumulative 
percentage for 10‐second window is less than 100% because some short sales cannot be matched even 
with a 10‐second window. Data are from Reg SHO short sales database and INET order database. 
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Figure 1: Average Price of Sample Stocks 
 
This figure displays the average daily closing price of the 200 sample stocks from May 2, 2005 through December 30, 
2005.  Shaded boxes indicate the sample months of June and December. Data are from CRSP. 
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